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EXCESS CONDEMNATION
J. B. STEINER*
Excess condemnation is the taking of land bordering on a condemna-
tion project that is not needed for the purposes of that project. A recent
writer on eminent domain says: "Under this theory the condemnor itself
goes into the real estate business in an attempt to salvage the enhanced
values created by the improvement."' If a street is widened and the city
takes land in excess of what is needed and holds that area until a profitable
sale can be realized, then the city would recoup in part the acquisition cost
of the street widening or project. Some advocates of excess condemnation
have suggested for it that public projects might be financed by such pro-
ceedings. Much would depend upon the increase in market value of the
excess appropriation.
This theory, and it has not advanced far in actual practice, is fraught
with difficulties, economic, as well as legal. The state would have to acquire
the land at a fair and reasonable price and, certainly, it would not be fair
to the property owner for the condemnor to "drive a bargain." Assuming
that the state secured the land at a reasonable price, it would have to sell
at a profit, and at a good one, to realize the purpose of the transaction.
Again the selling at a profit is based upon another assumption that the con-
demnor could sell as advantageously as an individual could.
There are other purposes of excess condemnation. For example, the
condemnor may acquire a greater area than what was considered necessary
at the time for a light plant or waterworks, or for any other purpose; if
so, it should be able to resell the surplus land. Very often in the widening
of streets it would be well to take the whole of certain parcels rather than
to leave remainders. In such cases the consequential damages to the re-
*Attorney, St. Louis, Missouri. LL.B., University of Missouri. Former Asso-
ciate City Counselor of City of St. Louis, Condemnation Division.
1. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN (1936) § 241.
(1)
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mainders very often approach the value of the whole parcel. Small remain-
ders alone are of little value to the owner. If a city acquired several adjacent
remainder parcels as an incident to a street opening, for instance, the use
of such parcels would be greatly increased, either for purposes of resale,
with or without restrictions, or as land adjacent to the main improvement
for the purpose of beautification.
The advocates of excess condemnation claim that a city should have
the right to acquire excess areas surrounding parks and plazas, and along
boulevards for the purpose of imposing certain restrictions as to use, and
then resell said areas so acquired. Such restrictions would be as to the
character of buildings, certain kinds of business, and unsightly billboards
fronting on said improvements. On the other hand, it is claimed by others
that such accomplishments can be obtained by zoning, or by the establish-
ment of building restriction lines through the exercise of the power of emi-
nent domain. These and all other questions of policy the writer will leave
to the city planner and the legislator to solve. The purpose of this article is
to deal with excess condemnation from a legal standpoint.
If excess condemnation is to be legally perfected constitutions and stat-
utes will have to clearly provide for such ends, and those requirements
will have to be strictly complied with in the condemnation proceedings. If
private property is taken, it must be for a public and not a private use. If
land is to be taken through what is called excess condemnation, it must be
for a public use. If such land is to be resold, the condemnor must take a
fee simple title in order to pass such a title to a purchaser. If the fee, or
other absolute title, does not pass, the land will not be resold. If constitu-
tions and statutes do not authorize the acquisition of the fee and the sale
thereof, excess condemnation cannot exist, for the purchaser will not invest
unless he can secure the same title he would get from a private party.
The Constitution of Missouri provides:
"That no private property can be taken for private use, with
or without compensation. . . .except for private ways of neces-
sity .... "
"That private property shall not be taken ...for public use
without just compensation.113
2. Mo. CoNsT. art II, § 20.
3. Mo. CONsT. art. II, § 21.
2
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Other state constitutional provisions are similar, except where, as in
many instances, special uses and purposes are named. Such broader consti-
tutional provisions are hereinafter discussed.
The Constitution4 of the United States provides:
"... nor shall private property be taken for public use with-
out just compensation."
That provision is in the nature of a limitation upon the use of the
power of eminent domain. "The power to take private property for public
uses," the Supreme Court of the United States said, ".. .belongs to every
independent government. It is an incident of sovereignty, and, as said in
Boom Co. v. Patterson, requires no constitutional recognition." 5
It is within the province of the courts to determine what is a public
use. 6 The Constitution of Missouri so provides.7  But what property is to
be taken for public use, the necessity, expediency and propriety of resorting
to eminent domain to acquire property are matters for the legislative de-
partment of the government to determine.,
THE TAKING MUST BE FOR PUBLIC USE
The term "public use" is not defined by constitution or statute and it
probably does not admit of concise definition for the reason that too much
depends upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the proposed project.
4. U. S. CONsT. Firm AMENDMENT.
5. 98 U. S. 403 (1878); also see United States v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513 (1883);
Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U. S. 472 (1924).
6. Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 282 (1893); Bassett v. Swenson, 51
Idaho 256, 5 P. (2d) 722 (1931); Root v. State, 207 Ind. 312, 192 N. E. 447 (1934);
Howard Realty Co. v. Paducah & I. R. R., 182 Ky. 494, 206 S. W. 774 (1918); Sav-
annah v. Hancock, 91 Mo. 54, 3 S. W. 215 (1886); Cape Girardeau v. Houck, 129
Mo. 607, 31 S. W. 933 (1895); City of Caruthersville v. Ferguson, 226 S. W. 912
(Mo. 1920); Hart v. Bothe, 247 S. W. 256 (Mo. App. 1923); Kansas City v. Liebi,
298 Mo. 569,252 S. W. 404 (1923); Cobb v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 172 N. C. 58,
89 S. E. 807 (1916); State ex rel. Red River Valley Co. v. District Court, 39 N. M.
523, 51 P. (2d) 239 (1935); Town of Perry v. Thomas, 82 Utah 159, 22 P. (2d)
343 (1933); City of Richmond v. Carneal, 129 Va. 388, 106 S. E. 403 (1921);
Shelton v. State Road Comm., 113 W. Va. 191, 167 S. E. 444 (1932).
7. Mo. CONST. art II, § 20.
8. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S. 53 (1913);
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 258 U. S. 13 (1922);
Boston v. Talbot, 206 Mass. 82, 91 N. E. 1014 (1910), and cases therein cited;
County Court of St. Louis County v. Griswold, 58 Mo. 175, 193 (1874); Kansas
City v. Liebi, 298 Mo. 569, 252 S. W. 404 (1923), and cases therein cited; State
ex rel. Red River Valley Co. v. District Court, 39 N. M. 523, 51 P. (2d) 239 (1935),
and cases therein cited; State ex Tel. Olcott v. Hawk, 105 Ore. 319, 208 Pac. 709
(1922), and cases therein cited; Philadelphia, M. & S. Street Ry's Petition, 203 Pa.
354, 362, 53 Ad. 191, 193 (1902); Ruddock v. City of Richmond, 165 Va. 552, 178
S. E. 44 (1935); NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN (2d ed. 1917) §§ 19, 329, 488.
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Lewis' has defined public use as follows:
"The public use of anything is the employment or application
of the thing by the public. Public use means the same as use by
the public, and this, it seems, is the construction the words should
receive in the constitutional provision in question."
Judge Cooley"0 gives the more liberal definition in the following lan-
guage:
"It may be for the public benefit that all the wild lands of
the State be improved and cultivated, all the low lands drained, all
the unsightly places beautified, all dilapidated buildings replaced
by new; because all these things tend to give an aspect of beauty,
... gratify the public taste; but the common law has never sanc-
tified an appropriation of property based upon these considerations
alone. .. ."
This, the more liberal definition, has as its basis, at least in part, the
police power of the state, as well as the application of the power of eminent
domain. Projects of this character include, among others, proceedings to
condemn lands for the purposes of irrigation, drainage of swamp lands, ac-
quisition of sewer rights-of-way and reclamation of flats and similar low-
lands.
With respect to state constitutions and statutes, they have been, and
can be, amended to avoid many difficulties in defining public uses and pur-
poses. The constitutional provisions of nineteen states, extending the uses
for which property may be taken, are found in Nichols."
In Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R. R.,12 the question was asked
whether or not the constitutional expression "public use" could be made
synonymous with public improvement, or general convenience and advan-
tage, without involving consequences inconsistent with the reasonable secur-
ity of private property. The answer given by the court was in the following
language:
"If an incidental benefit, resulting to the public from the
mode in which individuals in pursuit of their own interest use their
property, will constitute a public use of it, within the intention of
9. LEwis, EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. 1909) § 258.
10. 2 COOLEY'S CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (8th ed. 1927) 1131. On page
1129, the author points out that public use implies a possession, occupation and
enjoyment by the public at large, or by public agencies. For other definitions of
public use, see NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN (2d ed. 1917) § 39; 20 C. J. 552.
11. NIcHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN (2d ed. 1917) § 38.
12. 18 Wend. 9, 65 (N. Y. 1837).
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the constitution, it will be found very difficult to set limits to the
power of appropriating private property."
Due protection under the law has been given to the rights of private
property to prevent its seizure by the state. Court decisions make clear that
private property cannot be taken for a private use. In Arnsperger v. Craw-
ford, 3 the court held the appellant could not condemn a private road through
the properties of the appellees; that, if condemnation were permitted, the
private road could be fenced and the public would have no right therein.
It is to be noted, however, that the court adopted the conservative defini-
tion of public use and the opinion has been cited frequently by other
courts.
If private property is to be condemned for an alley, or a street, the public
use or purpose of the project is assumed or taken for granted. However,
there was a time when the question of the public use of a street or drive was
passed on by the courts. In Higginson v. Inhabitants of Nahant,'4 the
question was whether or not a pleasure drive encircling the shore of a
peninsula, and the taking of private property from one Higginson, who
enjoyed his estate with unmolested view, was a public use. The court held
that "passing from place to place" was a rightful object, and that "pleasure
travel may be accommodated, as well as business travel." The test was
whether or not the drive was for public travel.
The irrigation and mining decisions are pertinent here because they
show the liberal construction the courts have given to the term "public use."
In these cases the state constitutions and statutes have declared the public
policy with the view of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest
number." The results obtained are found in the following language:
"... when the common-law doctrine of riparian rights was
modified for the purposes of irrigation and mining, and a system
for appropriating and acquiring title to water adopted that made
it possible for populous and flourishing commonwealths to grow up
where the country otherwise would have remained a desert, unin-
habited, with the possible exception perhaps of an occasional cattle
or sheep ranch."'15
In Clark v. Nask,'8 the question was whether or not a Utah statute
which permitted the condemnation of land of one individual by another for
13. 101 Md. 247, 61 At. 413 (1905).
14. 11 Allen 530 (Mass. 1866).
15. Nash v. Clark, 27 Utah 158, 75 Pac. 371 (1904).
16. 198 U. S. 361 (1905). The defendant's land was north of and adjacent
to plaintiff's. The ditch traversed the defendant's land and came to about 100 feet
5
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the purpose of flowing water for irrigation was constitutionally in har-
mony with the Fourteenth Amendment. The court recognized that the
general public could not use the property for which it was being taken-
a test almost universally used. In affirming the decision of the state court
the Supreme Court of the United States said:
"This court has stated that what is a public use may fre-
quently and largely depend upon the facts surrounding the sub-
ject,... "
Clark v. Nash was followed in Strickley v. Higdand Boy Gold Mining
Company17 where the Utah statute18 provided that the right of eminent
domain may be exercised in behalf of the following uses:
".... roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes
and dumping places to facilitate the milling, smelting or other re-
duction of ores, or the working of mines."
The mining company, pursuant to said statute, instituted proceedings
to condemn a right of way for an aerial bucket line across a placer mining
claim of Strickley, from the company's mine in Bingham Canyon down
to the railway station two miles distant and 1200 feet below, over which
line ore was to be carried in suspended buckets. Strickley contended that
the aerial line was for a private use and therefore contrary to the 14th
Amendment. Among other things the court said:
"In the opinion of the legislature and the Supreme Court of
Utah the public welfare of that State demands that aerial lines
... should not be made impossible by the refusal of a private owner
to sell the right to cross his land. The Constitution of the United
States does not require us to say that they are wrong."
The Constitution of the United States was not violated because emi-
nent domain was omitted from the Fourteenth Amendment, and prohibi-
tion against the state is limited to depriving any person of life, liberty and
property without due process of law. If property is paid for the due process
of plaintiff's and was the only means by which plaintiff could get water, without
which his land was arid and valueless. The ditch was 18 inches wide and 12 inches
deep. Plaintiff sought a right of way to widen the ditch 12 inches making a total
width of 2 /2 feet. For this right of way over the defendant's land the damages in the
trial court were fixed at $40.00.
17. 200 U. S. 527 (1906), aff'd, 28 Utah 215, 78 Pac. 296 (1904).
18. UTAH REv. STAT. (1898) § 3588. In Dayton Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11
Nev. 394 (1876), a private concern acquired from an individual a right of way for
transporting mining materials to and from a mine.
6
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clause is satisfied. In these cases property rights were paid for under state
laws. The condemnation laws of those western states fostered agricultural
and mining industries. The courts held the proceedings to establish such
projects were for a public use and purpose because the welfare of the people
depended upon such industries; hence flourishing and prosperous common-
wealths grew and developed. These are instances that stand out alone in
their peculiar facts and circumstances where property was taken for a
public use.
Idaho has adopted the same broad view of public use,1 9 but Arizona
has not.- The mining and irrigation decisions were not followed by the
Supreme Court of New Mexico in Gallup American Coal Co. v. Gallup
Southwestern Coal Co.,2 ' where the statutes2 2 authorized coal mine owners
to acquire by condemnation proceedings rights-of-way over the property
of another coal company. There the constitutional provision23 on public
use was like that of Arizona. It will be observed that the policy of the law
in New Mexico seems to differ very materially from states like Utah, Nevada
and Idaho. These are matters which are not always easily explained.
Perhaps the most interesting decisions for a study of public use arose
under the grist mill statutes. Those statutes take us back to a very early
day in the history of this country. In North Carolina the Mills Act was
passed in 1777; in Pennsylvania, 1803; in Massachusetts the Provincial
Statute of 1714 was amended in 1796; in New Hampshire the Legislature
of the Province passed the Mills Act in 1718, which was largely copied
from Massachusetts.
Under the Mills Act of New Hampshire of 1868 any person, or corpo-
ration authorized by its charter, could erect and maintain a mill and mill
dam upon any non-navigable stream, and was authorized to condemn land
therefor. In Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Company,24 the courts held that upon
19. Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Peterson, 12 Idaho 769, 88 Pac. 426 (1906). In
IDAHO CONST. art I, § 14, "Public use" has been defined "as any, . .use necessary
to the complete development of the natural resources of the state."
20. In the Arizona Constitution, public use is not as broadly defined as in
Idaho and Utah. See Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co. v. New Keystone Copper
Co., 16 Ariz. 257, 144 Pac. 277 (1914). For further discussion of the mining and
irrigation decisions, see Hairston v. Danville & Western Ry., 208 U. S. 598 (1908).
21. 39 N. M. 344, 47 P. (2d) 414 (1935).
22. N. M. COMP. STAT. (1929) §§ 88- 401.
23. N. M. CONsT. art. II, § 20.
24. 56 N. H. 386 (1876), aff'd, 113 U. S. 9 (1885). The principal statutes of
the several states authorizing mills are found in this case on the margin of the page
at 113 U. S. 17. The present Missouri Statute is Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 9157 et
seq.; for public mills, see §§ 9185 et seq.
7
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payment of the damages the condemnor could take possession of Head's
land for the purpose of flowing it, and that the due process of law clause
under the Fourteenth Amendment was not violated. The Supreme Court
of the United States said:
"When property, in which several persons have a common in-
terest, cannot be fully and beneficially enjoyed in its existing con-
dition, the law often provides a way in which they may compel one
another to submit to measures necessary to secure its beneficial
enjoyment, making equitable compensation to any whose control
of or interest in the property is thereby modified."
This common interest which the court speaks of can be welded together
into one ownership by condemnation proceedings if for proper purposes, but
there was, however, no difficulty in condemning land for a grist mill in so
far as the public use was concerned. The public, that is the entire public, had
the right to service at the mill. In those days the people, virtually all the
people, raised their grain and took it to the neighborhood mill to be
ground. The amount of toll paid was fixed by custom or by statute. Those
mills were, of course, our first public utilities, and were just as important
as electricity is with us today, but that public business did not extend to
industries purely private. In Wisconsin it was held that a statute author-
izing a municipality to build a dam for the purpose of furnishing water
power to factories was void.2- In Illinois it was held that the contemplated
improvement of the waters of the Illinois and Fox rivers to run factories
in Ottawa at public expense was not a public use.
28
The case of Green v. Frazier,17 which involves public use under the
power of taxation, in our opinion, deserves attention here, because it shows
the extent a state may go without violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Taxation must be for a public use the same as condemnation must be for
a public use. In that case the Legislature of North Dakota authorized the
25. Attorney General v. Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400, 436 (1875).
26. Mather v. Ottawa, 114 Ill. 659, 666, 3 N. E. 216 (1885). La Grange, Mis-
souri was authorized by the legislature to issue bonds to donate to a private manu-
facturing plant The statute was held unconstitutional as providing for a tax for
private use. Cole v. City of LaGrange, 113 U. S. 1 (1885). The court cited in sup-
port of its holding the case of Loan Association v. Topeka, 87 U. S. 655 (1874), in
which case a statute that authorized a tax to aid a private concern in the manu-
facture of railroad iron was held void. A statute authorizing the county court to pay
bounties for planting trees on privately owned farms was held void by the Supreme
Court of Missouri. Deal v. Mississippi County, 107 Mo. 464, 18 S. W. 24 (1891);
Mo. CONsT. art IV, § 47; art. X, § 3.
27. 253 U. S. 233 (1920).
8
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state to organize a bank and operate it, to establish elevators, warehouses,
a system of flour mills, and to provide homes for residents through a Home
Building Association. An Industrial Commission, which was composed of
certain state officers with powers necessary to carry out the provisions of
such laws,2- was created. This commission had power to issue bonds, buy
and sell, fix prices, rates, etc. Taxes were provided to pay all bonds. The
commission was also given the right of eminent domain. These laws, passed
pursuant to 10 constitutional amendments, were held valid by the Supreme
Court of North Dakota. 29 The Supreme Court of the United States in
affirming the opinion of the state court pointed out that the due process
clause contained no specific limitation upon taxation within the states, but
that taxation by the states could not be levied for merely private pur-
poses. 30 In affirming the decision of the North Dakota Court, the Supreme
Court of the United States said:
"The precise question herein involved so far as we have been
able to discover has never been presented to this court. The nearest
approach to it is found in Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U. S. 217,
in which we held that an act of the State of Maine authorizing
cities or towns to establish and maintain wood, coal and fuel yards
for the purpose of selling these necessaries to the inhabitants of
cities and towns, did not deprive taxpayers of due process of law
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."
The meaning of public use, as defined by the North Dakota Supreme
Court, was not disturbed under the due process clause. In that respect,
the decision is a complete analogy of the mining and irrigation cases,
except that the use in the latter cases was a public necessity upon which
the welfare of the whole population of those states depended for their exist-
ence, but in North Dakota the constitution and statutes authorized the
entry of the state into private business as its public welfare.
When property is taken for a railroad, including its construction and
operation, the public use is not questioned.3 1 Railroads are public high-
ways, and toll bridges and ferry landings are also parts of public highways
and they are so used. 32
28. N. D. Laws 1919, c. 147, 148, 150-154.
29. 44 N. D. 395, 176 N. W. 11 (1920).
30 Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 155 (1896).
31. C. B. & Q. R. R. v. McCooey, 273 Mo. 29, 200 S. W. 59 (1917).
32. So. Ill. & Mo. Bridge Co. v Stone, 174 Mo 1, 22, 73 S W. 453, 458 (1903).
9
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In Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Town of Cicero,3 an attempt was made to
draw a distinction between right of way land, 53 feet of which was used for
tracks and 47 feet of which it was assumed might be used for other than
railroad purposes, and therefore might be put on the market and sold for
business purposes, the court said:
"Whether obtained by voluntary conveyance or condemnation,
it is held for railroad purposes ..... 'It does not hold land, as does
the ordinary owner, with the right of using it for any purpose to
which it may be adapted, or with the right to sell it at the highest
price which it may bring in the market.' . . . To permit it to do so
would be to allow private property to be indirectly taken for pri-
vate use."
Under this holding a railroad could not engage in the real estate busi-
ness, or change the use for which the land was taken. Lance's Appeal,3
another railroad case, which dealt with fundamental phases of eminent do-
main, is pertinent here:
"The power arises out of that natural principle which teaches
that private convenience must yield to the public wants. . . . It
requires no argument to prove that after the right has been exercised
the use of the property must be held in accordance with and for the
purposes which justified its taking."
As the court pointed out, among other things, that it would be a fraud
upon the owner to take his property for railroad purposes and build private
homes or mills, or erect machinery not connected with the use of the com-
pany's franchise, or build and conduct stores, taverns, shops and the like
along the right of way, and other uses not thought of under the prescribed
terms of acquisition. Such uses, the conclusion was, would not be a public
use. Under decisions of this character a railroad could not take advantage
of excess condemnation.
In 1874 the Missouri legislature passed an act 35' to establish Forest
Park for the benefit of the inhabitants of St. Louis County, in the eastern
part thereof, near to and outside the corporate limits of St. Louis. It was
contended in County Court of St. Louis County v. Griswold35 that a park
33. 157 Ill. 48, 53, 41 N. E. 640, 641 (1895).
34. 55 Pa. 16, 25 (1867).
35. Mo. Laws 1874, p. 371.
36. 58 Mo. 175, 196 (1874). The Supreme Court of California held in County
of San Benito v. Copper Mountain Mining Co., 7 Cal. App. (2d) 82, 45 P. (2d) 428
(1935), that a public park condemned for the purpose of granting and conveying
it, without consideration, to the United States was a public use; that a park was
10
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was not a public use; that the park was not demanded by St. Louis County,
but by the City of St. Louis. The Supreme Court of Missouri said:
"Private property is taken for public use when it is appropriat-
ed for the common use of the public at large. A stronger instance
cannot be given than that of property converted into a public park.
A public park becomes the property of the public at large ...
There is sufficient, then, on the face of this act to warrant us in
holding that the park in question is for public use."
In State ex rel. Smith v. Kemp,3 7 the supreme court held valid a statute
which authorized condemnation proceedings for the acquisition of "any tract
or parcel of land in the State of Kansas, which possessed unusual historical
interest."' s This use which was in the nature of a park, was held a public
use by the Supreme Court of the United States in the same case.39
In Kansas City v. Liebi,40 the city undertook by condemnation proceed-
ings, pursuant to ordinance, to restrict the use of property along Gladstone
Boulevard, a residential street, more specifically, the establishment of a
building line thirty-five feet from either side of the boulevard. The ordi-
nance fixed the benefit or taxing district within 150 feet from either side of
the boulevard, and provided that the damages should be paid by special
assessments within said district. The ordinance also prohibited billboards,
gasoline stations and gasoline tanks of more than 100 gallons within said
benefit district.
In passing on the question of public use the Supreme Court of Missouri
adopted the liberal view of "public use," as given by Nichols4 1 and other
authorities, to the effect that "public use" was synonymous with "public
benefit" or "public advantage." If these words are read in connection with
the facts, the circumstances and conditions to which they are kindred, their
meaning is obvious.
a public use where it was to be used by the people of a town, city, county, state or
nation. Note the cases therein cited which show that many of the national parks
have been acquired in part by gifts from the states. In this connection see the recent
cases of State v. Oliver, 162 Tenn. 100, 35 S. W. (2d) 396 (1931); Yarborough v.
North Carolina Park Comm., 196 N. C. 284, 145 S. E. 563 (1928).
37. 124 Kan. 716, 261 Pac. 556 (1927).
38. KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 26, art. III; see Kan. Laws 1927, c. 205.
39. Roe v. Kansas, 278 U. S. 191 (1929).
40. 298 Mo. 569, 252 S. W. 404 (1923).
41. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN (2d ed. 1917) 130, 131; LEWIS, EMINENT
DOMAIN (3d ed. 1909) § 257; COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (7th ed. 1903)
§ 766; 20 C. J. 552; County Court of St. Louis County v. Griswold, 58 Mo. 175 (1874).
11
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In order to constitute a public use it is no longer necessary that the
entire community should actually use the improvement. Its public character
is not lessened by the fact that the benefit inures largely to a group of indi-
viduals.4 2 Public enjoyment is always created by the establishment of a
boulevard driver or a public park. No one questions the legality of a park-
way along a street although it is not traveled, not taken in possession by the
public. It is merely an ornament.
In Salisbury Land & Improvement Co. v. Commonwealtl,4 3 the state
of Massachusetts attempted to acquire a beach for a public reservation
or park by eminent domain with power to sell or lease said property, or part
of it, in the discretion of the Salisbury Beach Reservation Commission. The
statute4 4 made it clear that it was intended that real and personal property
was to be sold as the commission "may deem advisable," for the right to
sell was in no way limited by the statute. In holding the statute unconsti-
tutional, the court said:
"Private property cannot be taken directly or indirectly for a
private end. It cannot be seized ostensibly for a public use and
then diverted to a private use."
The court distinguished the case from Boston v. Talbot,4 5 where the stat-
ute46 authorized the taking of the fee and easements, including the right to
go under the surface, or through or under buildings, or parts of building,
and that the taking may be confined to a section of a parcel, fixed by hori-
zontal planes of division, below, above, or on the surface, and the authority
was given to sell, or remove any buildings from the land, and to sell or
42. Kansas City v. Liebi, 298 Mo. 569, 252 S. W. 404 (1923), 28 A. L. R. 295
(1924), and cases therein cited. We omit the zoning features of the Liebi case
although they are closely involved in the decision. It is worthy of note, however,
that zoning restrictions may now be imposed under the police power of the state.
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926); State ex rel. Oliver Cadillac Co.
v. Christopher, 317 Mo. 1179, 298 S. W. 720 (1927).
43. 215 Mass. 371, 102 N. E. 619 (1913). In Opinion of Justices, 204 Mass.
607, 91 N. E. 405 (1910) the court held that the legislature could not authorize a
municipal corporation to condemn land in excess of what was needed for public
streets, to be leased to merchants for the encouragement of commercial in-
terests of the municipality. In Kaukauna Water Power Co. v. Green Bay & Miss.
Canal Co., 142 U. S. 254 (1891), the court held, although the state could not ap-
propriate property of individuals for the purpose of creating water power to be leased
for manufacturing purposes, that, if there was a surplus of water, the state could
dispose of such surplus water as an incident to the right to make the public improve-
ment.
44. MASS. STAT. (1912) c. 715.
45. 206 Mass. 82, 91 N. E. 1014 (1910).
46. MAss. STAT. (1902) c. 534.
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lease any interest taken, whenever such interest or property ceased to be
needed for such purposes. The construction of the tunnel and its under-
ground stations with the approaches thereto called for the use of land not
necessary for the tunnel as completed. There were risks and possible dam-
age to buildings and foundations not within the limits of the tunnel. In
the construction work the contractor would have no right to use the adjoin-
ing land without permission from the owner thereof, and, in many instances,
such permission could not be obtained on account of the possible damage
to the property. In that case the court held that the legislature might, in
the interest of economy, provide for the taking of excess land, including
buildings, and to provide for the sale of land, not needed for the tunnel
easement, when the Transit Commission should decide such remainders
were not needed; that said excess taking and said sale or sales were merely
incidental to the main project, that of making a right of way for a tunnel,
a thing of permanency.
The court also distinguished its ruling from the case of Moore v. San-
ford, 4 7 where the statute"8 authorized the taking of certain lands, known as
flats"9 adjacent to the Boston harbor by eminent domain, which, when filled
by solid earth, would be sold, and would yield a possible pecuniary benefit
to the commonwealth. Without this filling, reclamation in other words,
the land was worthless. This project contemplated the improvement of
Boston harbor, an instrument of commerce, railroad and commercial ac-
tivities. The court considered the improvement of the harbor, alone, was
a public use of greater importance than a local advantage.
The statute in the Salisbury case would have permitted the condemnor
to engage in the real estate business, but in Boston v. Talbot the sale of
47. 151 Mass. 285, 24 N. E. 323 (1890).
48. Mass. Acts 1884, c. 290.
49. The Boston flats were areas of lowlands, portions of which were constantly
under water. These lowlands were along Charles River, and adjacent to the water-
front, and were affected in varying degrees by high and low tides. Back Bay, an
area of about 200 acres, at one time was a sheet of water, "nothing less than a great
cesspool." Back Bay well covered by water in high tide, was in low tide a useless
and unsightly place. The use of Charles River for sewerage purposes caused Back
Bay at low tide to become a menace to public health. Back Bay has been filled,
properly drained and rebuilt; it is now a fine residential section of Boston. A park,
known as Back Bay Fens, not part of the Charles River Basin, is also reclaimed
land. The original peninsula of Boston which had an area of 783 acres, has been
enlarged to 1829 acres-a reclamation from water to "made land." This reclamation
accomplished for the purpose of sanitation and of expanding the city's usable area,
has been a development covering many years. ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERIcANA (1839-
1847); AMERICAN MAGAZINE OF ART, 13: 75-80, March 1922, "Redeeming a Water-
front"
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parts or parcels of land taken in condemnation was merely incidental to
the main purpose of establishing the tunnel. These parcels were only to
be sold when the Tunnel Commission decided they were not needed for
public use. In Moore v. Sanford, worthless land was reclaimed, made usable,
as an adjunct to the harbor, a distinct public use, although there was an
incidental private benefit. The making of the Boston flats usable is com-
parable to the public use, benefit and utility derived from irrigation and
mining cases.
In Pennsylvania excess condemnation was held invalid in 1913. In
Pennsylvania Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Philadelphia,"0 the stat-
utes"' authorized cities to appropriate private property within 200 feet of
land appropriated for parkways in order to protect the same by resale of
neighboring property with restrictions. Section 3 conferred upon the proper
authorities the right "to resell such neighboring property with such restric-
tions in the deeds of resale" of said property. Section 4 declared the
appropriation of property for such purposes "to be taking . . . for public
use." The Philadelphia ordinance provided for the acquisition of private
property outside of and within 200 feet of the parkway, a projected street
extending from the City Hall to Fairmount Park for the purpose of imposing
restrictions on and for the resale of said excess area.
The court reasoned that the only "public use" was the protection of
the parkway; that the only "use" the city could make of the property was
to impose restrictions on the property in the hands of the purchaser from
the city, and the fee was to be sold to private parties for private use. The
court said:
"Holding, as we do, that the use to be made of property
located outside a public highway is not a public use, for which
private property may be taken by the city against the consent of
the owner, the effect of the act of 1907, . . . is to permit, by the
exercise of eminent domain, the taking of the property of one
citizen without his consent and vesting the title thereto in another."
It is hardly necessary to state that excess condemnation was not legal
in Pennsylvania.2 Those same purposes may be accomplished in Mis-
souri by building line restrictions as in Kansas City v. Liebi. 3
50. 242 Pa. 47, 88 At. 904 (1913).
51. Pa. Laws 1907, p. 466, §§ 1-4.
52. In Valmont Development Company v. Rosser, 297 Pa. 140, 146 At. 557
(1929), it was contended that the area taken for a bridge approach was greater than
that allowed by law. The court held that cities building for the future were bound
14
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The constitution 5u of Ohio in 1912 provided for excess condemnation
in the following language:
"A municipality appropriating or otherwise acquiring prop-
erty for public use may in furtherance of such public use appropriate
or acquire an excess over that actually to be occupied by the im-
provement, and may sell such excess with such restrictions as shall
be appropriate to preserve the improvement made."
In Cincinnati the city undertook to widen Fifth street from Pike to
Main streets by taking twenty-five feet on the south side thereof, and to
acquire certain excess parcels on or along the widened street. There were
three excess parcels involved in the case of Cincinnati v. Vester,-4 two of
which fronted on the south side of the proposed Fifth street, the northern
twenty-five feet of each was to be taken in said street widening, and the
remainders were to be taken in the excess areas along with a third parcel
which was 19 feet south of the proposed street widening.
The city council was required by the Ohio statutes to pass a resolu-
tion "defining the purpose of the appropriation." The purpose of the excess
appropriation, as stated in the resolution, was in the most general terms,
namely, "in furtherance of the said widening of Fifth street," and was
"necessary for the complete enjoyment and preservation of said public use."
The Supreme Court of the United States said:
"In what way the excess condemnation of these properties
was in furtherance of the widening of the street, and why it was
necessary for the complete enjoyment and preservation of the
public use of the widened street are not stated and are thus left
to surmise."
The contentions of counsel indicate that one of the purposes for the
excess appropriation was the recoupment of expenses from the increased
values, but it was not so defined and set forth in the resolution. The court
only by factors of reasonableness and projects may reasonably include useful, orna-
mental and artistic designs. In New York in 1893 excess condemnation, that is, for
the purpose of disposing of surplus land acquired by eminent domain was held valid.
The land in that case had been acquired for a park and in the course of time had
become useless for that purpose. In re City of Rochester, 137 N. Y. 243, 247, 33 N. E.
320, 321 (1893).
53. 298 Mo. 569, 252 S. W. 404 (1923).
53a. OHIO CONsT. art. XVIII, § 10.
54. 281 U. S. 439 (1930). The Vester case was cited in East Cleveland v. Nau,
124 Ohio St. 433, 179 N. E. 187 (1931), where the Supreme Court of Ohio said that
the purposes of excess condemnation must be specified and that such purposes must
be proven by evidence in order to establish the public use.
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adverted to the well established rule in condemnation proceedings that
the constitutional and statutory requirements must be strictly complied
with, hence the proceedings for the excess appropriation failed.
The Supreme Court of Michigan in 1931-33 recognized excess con-
demnation as valid in Emmons v. Detroit.5 The constitution" provided:
"In exercising the powers of eminent domain and in taking
the fee of land and property that is needed for the acquiring,
opening and widening of boulevards, streets and alleys, munici-
palities shall not be limited to the acquisition of the land to be cov-
ered by the proposed improvement, but may take such other land
and property adjacent to the proposed improvement as may be
appropriate to secure the greatest degree of public advantage from
such improvement. After so much of the land and property has
been appropriated for any such needed public purpose, the remain-
der may be sold or leased with or without such restrictions as may
be appropriate to the improvement made."
In the widening of Plymouth street in Detroit it appears that all of
lot 105 was taken, but that the northern 15 feet of the lot extended beyond
the street line. This fifteen foot strip was not paved and was not used
for street purposes. The street laid between the improved street and the
plaintiff's property. She was assessed a tax bill for paving the street as a
property owner fronting on the street. The court held that plaintiff's
property was not abutting on the street and, therefore, her property was not
liable for the assessment; that the city had paid for and acquired the fifteen
foot strip in fee and that under the constitutional amendment of 1928 the
area in question could be sold by the city. Under these decisions cities
may take remainders of parcels where consequential damages would, to-
gether with the actual damages, amount to the value of the whole parcel.
The court made it clear that excess condemnation in that state was legal.
CONDEMNOR MUST TAKE A FEE SIMPLE TITLE
As to whether or not a fee may be taken by condemnation, Lewis, in
his work on eminent domain, has spoken very clearly on the subject in
the following language:
55. 255 Mich. 558, 238 N. W. 188 (1931); same case after reargument, 261
Mich. 455, 246 N. W. 179 (1933).
56. MICH. CONsT. art XIII, § 5; MIcH. Comp. LAWS (1929) §§ 3912-14, and
Mich. Laws 1929, Act 190, authorize municipalities to purchase or condemn the
fee to real estate. In City of Chicago v. McCluer, 339 Il1. 610, 171 N. E. 737 (1930),
the city took a strip of land two feet by 125 feet, lying along the widened street.
The court held the matter was "too trifling an error to defeat a major improvement"
16
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"In absence of any constitutional restraint, it rests with the
legislature to say what interest or estate in the lands shall be taken
for public use. The whole matter thus being in the discretion of
the legislature, it may authorize a fee to be taken, and necessarily
may authorize any lesser estate or interest to be taken, according
to its views of the requirements of the grantee and the demands of
the public.57
"If the statute provides that a fee shall vest, it is usually held
to mean a fee simple absolute."' 8
"If absolute, then no individual has any interest in the land
or its use, and it may be devoted to any purpose in the discretion
of the legislature, or even sold to private parties." 59
In Corpus Juris" we find substantially the same text as that given
above by Lewis, but the courts are not uniform in their holdings with respect
to the condemnation of the fee.
In Sweet v. Buffalo, N. Y. & Philadelphia Ry.," the purpose of the
condemnation suit was to lay out a public ground for a sea-wall. The stat-
ute declared, upon payment of the award, that "the fee shall vest in the
city of Buffalo, . . . and thenceforth shall be and remain a public ground
for maintaining ... a sea-wall." The court held the language was sufficient
to pass the fee, but that the public use declared was in the nature of a
trust engrafted on the fee. In Missouri 62 where the statute 3 provided that
a fee simple title should vest in the railroad company for its right-of-way,
it was held by the court to vest a qualified or terminable fee, and that
upon abandonment of the use the title would revert, although the language
used authorized the company to take a fee simple title and to sell and
dispose of the same. This case arose under a statute in Missouri before there
was a limitation on the title a railroad company might take by condemnation.
Two of the judges, holding that excess condemnation was not authorized, dissented.
The charter of the City of St. Louis provides for excess condemnation when author-
ized by the Missouri legislature. City Charter, 1914, art. XXI, § 16.
57. Lxwis, EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. 1909) § 448.
58. Id. at § 450.
59. Id. at § 219.
60. 20 C. J. 1221, 1223; see also NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN (2d ed. 1917) §§
150, 157, 334.
61. 79 N. Y. 293 (1879).
62. Kellogg v. Malin, 50 Mo. 496 (1872).
63. Mo. R. R. LAWS (1859) 51, 52; Mo. LAWS 1853, p. 355; other railroad
statutes of Missouri, providing for taking the fee are: Mo. Laws 1836, p. 247; Mo.
Laws 1846, p. 156; Mo. Laws 1847, p. 145; Mo. Laws 1871, p. 59; Mo. Laws 1849,
p. 219; Mo. Laws 1851, p. 272.
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The constitution- of Missouri provides that the fee simple title cannot
be taken for railroad right-of-way without the consent of the owner. In
other words, a railroad cannot condemn the fee. In Allen v. Beasley,"" the
court pointed out that, since the decision of Kellogg v. Malinl6 where rail-
road corporations were authorized by statute to condemn the fee for right-
of-way purposes, similar statutes had been construed to mean no more
than an easement. Such is the rule in Missouri, but there are states where
the appellate courts hold that railroad corporations may condemn the fee. 7
But with respect to the purchase by a railroad for a valuable considera-
tion the railroad acquires the fee. The Supreme Court of Missouri so held
in Coates & Hopkins Realty Company v. K. C. Terminal Ry. On princi-
ple, if a railroad pays for the fee, that is the full market value either by
bargain and sale, or by condemnation, we see no reason why it should not
acquire the fee simple title.
In City of AIoberly v. Lotterr9 the court held the Missouri statute was
sufficient to authorize the city to acquire the fee and said statute did not
violate any constitutional provision. In County Court of St. Louis County
v. Griswold,7 0 the court held that Forest Park vested in St. Louis County
in fee.7 1 Later the question of the title to Forest Park came before the
Supreme Court of Missouri in State ex rel. Wood v. Schweickhardt2 and the
court, referring to the Griswold case, said:
64. Mo. CONsT. art II, § 21.
65. 297 Mo. 544, 553, 249 S. W. 387, 389 (1923).
66. 50 Mo. 496 (1872).
67. See authorities cited in Coates & Hopkins Realty Co. v. K C. Terminal
Ry., 328 Mo. 1118, 1134, 43 S. W. (2d) 817, 822 (1931); 2 LEwis, EMINENT DOMAIN
(3d ed. 1909) 1496.
68. 328 Mo. 1118, 1134, 43 S. W. (2d) 817, 822 (1931), where the court said:
"Neither our constitution nor our statutes .. . discloses any limitation upon the
power of a railroad corporation to hold, purchase, or convey the fee in land when
acquired by bargain and sale upon a valuable consideration."
69. 266 Mo. 457, 181 S. W. 991 (1915). There the statute provided that
upon payment of compensation the "circuit court.., shall.., order, adjudge and
decree that the title, in fee,. . . be ... vested forever in the city ... " See Mo. REv.
STAT. (1919) § 8344. This section was amended in 1929 by changing the fee to an
easement. See Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 6862. Section 7089 authorizes cities of the
fourth class to take the fee.
70. 58 Mo. 175 (1874).
71. Here again the statute provided that upon payment of the award "the cir-
cuit court shall immediately order and decree that the title in fee ... be ... vested
forever in the people of St. Louis County."
72. 109 Mo. 496, 508, 19 S. W. 47, 50 (1892). It may be noted that by the
Constitution of 1875 the St. Louis city limits were extended to include Forest Park,
but the park was acquired by condemnation prior to the adoption of the Constitu-
tion of 1875.
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"It cannot be doubted ... that the absolute property in the
park has been vested in the city. .. ."
In Neil v. Independent Realty Company,73 it was urged that the dedica-
tion of a street passed the fee to the city. The statute provided that:
"Such maps or plats . . .shall be a sufficient conveyance to
vest the fee of such parcels of land . . .intended for public uses
... in trust and for the uses therein.., intended...."
The court held that the fee was limited to the trust named, and the
dedication was not a conveyance of a fee simple title, but only an ease-
ment, and upon vacation the dedicator was seized, freed of the easement.
In other words, under the statute a trust was engrafted on the fee. Cer-
tainly the legislature did not provide for an absolute fee, but, on the
contrary, the dedication was limited to street purposes. Other limited
fees referred to in condemnation proceedings are qualified or terminable
fees. 74  The general rule is that an easement or less than a fee is created
unless it is clear that a fee was intended, or necessarily implied from the
language used.7 5
In Wyoming Coal & Transportation Company v. Price76 the court in
construing the statute7 7 providing that "upon payment (of the damages)
... the state shall be seized of such lands as of an absolute estate in per-
petuity," was held to mean a fee simple title and that the commonwealth,
having acquired certain land for canal purposes upon abandonment of that
use, by change of route, could pass the fee title by conveyance thereof.
The same court in Lazarus v. Morris,7T where the land was taken for a school,
that is for use and occupation and the erection of a school building thereon,
very properly held that only an easement was acquired, and when the
use ceased the land reverted to the original owners. However, the court
pointed out that if the statute gave an absolute fee and full compensation
73. 317 Mo. 1235, 298 S. W. 363, 70 A. L. R. 550 (1927).
74. Fairchild v. St. Paul, 46 Minn. 540, 49 N. W. 325 (1891); Smith v.
Minneapolis, 112 Minn. 446, 128 N. W. 819 (1910); See Sweet v. Buffalo, N. Y. &
Philadelphia Ry., 79 N. Y. 293 (1879). We can see no practical difference between
a terminable fee and an easement. In either case when the use is abandoned the
property reverts to the original owner or his grantees. Where there is no abandon-
ment, an easement to all intents and purposes, is just as usable as the fee. If, how-
ever, the condemnor desires the reversion in order to have a salable estate at the
end of the use, the fee simple title should be acquired.
75. 20 C. J. § 583.
76. 81 Pa. 156 (1876).
77. Act Feb. 26, 1826, Pamph. L. 55, § 8.
78. 212 Pa. 128, 61 Atl. 815 (1905).
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was paid, the whole title was acquired. It is elementary that the prop-
erty owner should be paid for all interest taken.79
The old case of Dingley v. BostonO is very interesting in that it is
a precedent followed by many courts. There the legislature in 1867 passed
an act,8 1 the purpose of which was to enable the city of Boston to preserve
the public health and to abate a nuisance then existing in a certain area,
about sixteen acres, known as the Church Street District. The plan adopted
was to raise the grade by filling in the district, including the streets, to the
height of eighteen feet, and to provide for a system of drainage which would
carry the sewage into deep water. The city was authorized to lay rail-
road tracks through any streets of the city in order to transport earth and
other material to fill up the area and abate the nuisance. All these changes
were to be made without injuriously affecting the lands of the common-
wealth or its grantees in Back Bay. The city was authorized to purchase
or otherwise take the lands with buildings and fixtures thereon. After
taking such lands the city was to file with the registry of deeds of Suffolk
County the description of the lands so taken and "the title to all land so
taken shall vest in the city of Boston." Provision was made for the assess-
ment and the payment of damages. The court held the statute was con-
stitutional and that the fee simple title vested in the city as the absolute
owner, and without consent of the property owners, and that it could dis-
pose of the fee simple title. The court pointed out that the constitution
conferred authority upon the legislature to pass "all manner of wholesome
and reasonable laws . . . not repugnant or contrary to this Constitution."
While the general policy of the law was expressed in the constitution, yet
property rights were protected by the payment of just compensation. The
case, being one of reclamation, the situation was quite similar to that of
the establishment of drainage districts to reclaim swamp lands, 2 or to flow
arid lands.8 '
Under public use we cited the case of Boston v. Talbot.8 a With respect
to the taking of a fee the court said:
79. 20 C. J. § 583; Carroll v. City of Newark, 108 N. J. L. 323, 158 Ad. 458
(1932); Thompson v. Orange & Rockland Electric Co., 254 N. Y. 366, 173 N. E.
224 (1930); Ramsey v. Leeper, 168 Okla. 43, 31 P. (2d) 852 (1934).
80. 100 Mass. 544 (1868).
81. MAss. STAT. (1867) c. 308, § 1.
82. Houck v. Little River Drainage District, 248 Mo. 373, 154 S. W. 739
(1913).
83. See irrigation cases, supra.
83a. 206 Mass. 82, 91 N. E. 1014 (1910).
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". .. that the legislature may determine what kind of an
estate it is necessary to take to accomplish the public purpose for
which the taking is made, and may take a fee, even though the use
of the fee may not be permanent. Sweet v. Buffalo Ry., 79 N. Y.
293; Waterworks v. Burkhart, 41 Ind. 364; Dingley v. Boston, ubi
supra; Burnett v. Boston, ubi supra. The Legislature well might
determine that a taking in fee might be necessary in certain cases,
in reference to a reasonably economical management of the busi-
ness in the public interest, even though the use of the fee would not
be needed permanently, and might authorize a subsequent sale or
leasing of any rights in the property that were no longer devoted
to the public use. We see no reason for doubting the constitu-
tionality of the act."
Here the taking of the fee for the purpose of resale or leasing as an
economical management in the public interest was held valid.
The general rule is that the fee is used by its owner for all legitimate
purposes, and a municipality holding the fee should be no exception to the
rule, but in Higginson v. Slattery8 4 the court restrained the erection of a
school building upon a public park, known as Back Bay Fens, which the
city of Boston had acquired in fee (by condemnation) in 1879. By
legislative act the state in 1911 authorized the erection of a high school of
commerce in the park without the exercise of the right of eminent domain,
presumably unnecessary, since the park was held in fee. The court made
it clear that the absolute title was vested in the city and that the use could
be changed without reversion to the former owners. The record showed
that only 79 per cent of the building was to be used for the school, and
the remainder, as planned, was to be used for administrative offices, which
use was not authorized by the statute. The 1911 act was held invalid.
In 1893 New York held that the resale of the fee, acquired by con-
demnation, was valid.A5 Again in 1930 New York approved the acquisition
of the fee by condemnation proceedings. In Thompson v. Orange & Rock-
land Electric Company,8 where the statute"7 provided that "the title to the
lands described in the petition .. .shall vest in the county for the purpose
84. 212 Mass. 583, 99 N. E. 523 (1912).
85. In re City of Rochester, 137 N. Y. 243, 247, 33 N. E. 320, 321 (1893).
The court made it clear that the city could not enter into the real estate business;
that the acquisition and resale of the fee was incidental to certain public uses, which
in the course of time changed or were abandoned.
86. 254 N. Y. 366, 173 N. E. 224 (1930). The court cited with approval
Sweet v. Buffalo N. Y & Philadelphia Ry., 79 N. Y. 293 (1879).
87. N. Y. CoNs. LAws (1930) c. 25, §§ 148, 150, 155.
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of a highway forever," the court held that the language was sufficient to
pass the fee to the county. However, the legislative intent to pass the fee
was further indicated by the language of Section 155 which authorized the
state and county officials to "sell, convey, grant or lease to the owner or
owners of property adjoining the same, so much thereof as may be unneces-
sary for highway purposes."
In Carroll v. City of Newark,"' the court held the fee was not deter-
mined by the fact that the city had abandoned the specific use for which
the lands were condemned and devoted to another public use, that of a
street. The court did not pass upon the question whether or not the fee
was terminable if the lands were sold, since the question of resale was not
before the court.
In Skelly Oil Co. v. Kelly,"9 the city of Atchison condemned certain lands
for a public park, which were never used for park purposes. The statute '
under which the lands were condemned provided, "the title . . . shall vest
in such city." The land in question was sold to the defendant who erected
a filling station thereon. The former owner from whom the land was con-
demned sought to recover on the theory that the city had acquired only
an easement. The Supreme Court of Kansas in passing on the question
held the statute was controlling with the result that the city, and its grantee,
acquired the fee simple title. The decision, it is interesting to note, was
based entirely upon the statute and no other court opinions were discussed.
The Kansas case was followed by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
in Ramsey v. Leeper,91 with probably greater emphasis, on the right to
acquire the fee simple title by the exercise of the right of eminent domain.
In that case numerous statutes92 were discussed, but the statute which the
court held to govern the case is as follows:
"Every municipality . . . shall have the right and power to
acquire, own and maintain, within or without the corporate limits
88. 108 N. J. L. 323 158 Atd. 458 (1932); N. J. COMP. STAT. (1910) §§ 1006,
1008, 1010-14. Under the New Jersey Statutes, the state takes an easement for high-
way purposes. N. J. Laws 1927, p. 725. Holcombe v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
109 N. J. L. 551, 162 AtI. 760 (1932). See also Bentley v. City of Newark, 108 N. J.
L. 317, 158 Atl. 463 (1932).
89. 134 Kan. 176, 5 P. (2d) 823 (1931).
90. KAN. REV. STAT. (1923) § 26-204; KAN. REv. STAT. (1935) § 26-204.
91. 168 Okla. 43, 31 P. (2d) 852 (1934).
92. OKLA. COMP. STAT. (1921) § 4507. Incidentally, the statute also provided:
"Every municipal corporation within this state shall have the right to engage in any
business or enterprise which may be engaged in by a person, firm or corporation
by virtue of a franchise from such corporation."
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of such city, real estate for sites and rights of way for public
utility and public park purposes and for the location thereon of
waterworks ... and for all such purposes shall have the power of
eminent domain."
In 1917, Oklahoma City acquired without the city limits, in Canadian
county, 82.79 acres for the purpose of a system of waterworks to supply
water for the city. The final judgment gave the city a fee simple title for
full value paid. The land in question, thirty acres, was not used or needed
for the purposes for which it was condemned and was deeded to one W. R.
Ramsey with certain restrictions imposed. No question was raised as to
the form of the deed and of the right to impose restrictions. The question
before the court was whether or not the city could acquire a fee simple title
by condemnation. The whole case hinged on the use of the word "own,"
that is, whether or not the language as used in the statute was sufficient
to vest a fee. After discussing many decisions construing the language nec-
essary to pass a fee, the court held the word "own," as used in the statute,
meant an unqualified vesting of the title, and the fact that the city did not
use all of the land condemned, did not "limit the character of the estate
acquired in the land." The judgment vested a fee simple title in the city
and the conclusion is that it passed, in the resale of the land, all the inci-
dents of such a title. There was no constitutional restriction which pre-
vented the taking or passing of a fee simple title.
We do not overlook the important case of Emmons v. Detroit92a where
the constitution and statutes authorize the acquisition of the fee simple
title in street widening. The language of the court is clear and distinct
without equivocation to the effect that when the city paid for the property
the fee vested in the city and that the surplus area could be sold, with or
without restrictions, appropriate to the improvement made.
The tendency of the states, and their duly authorized agents, is to
take the fee in the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
93
92a. 255 Mich. 558, 238 N. W. 188 (1931).
93. City of San Gabriel v. Pacific Electric Ry., 129 Cal. App. 460, 18 P. (2d)
996 (1933); Driscoll v. City of New Haven, 75 Conn. 92, 52 Atl. 618 (1902) (hold-
ing that the state had the power to authorize the taking of a fee as well as an ease-
ment, citing Dingley v. Boston, 100 Mass. 544 (1868) ); Bookville & Metamora
Hydraulic Co. v. Butler, 91 Ind. 134 (1883); Roanoke City v. Berkowitz, 80 Va.
616 (1885). In Iowa the cities and towns take the fee simple title for their streets.
Inc. Town of Lamoni v. Smith, 217 Iowa 264, 251 N. W. 706 (1933). For street
purposes it was held in Miller-Carey Drilling Co. v. Shaffer, 144 Kan. 508, 61 P. (2d)
1320 (1936), that the fee to the streets vested in the county. In O'Connor v. City
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The question might be asked, what is the effect of the vacation of a
street or an alley where the city owns the fee simple title? The answer is
substantially the same as if an easement were vacated. The question is a
matter of statutory regulation. 4
CONCLUSIONS
It follows from the decisions reviewed that the condemnor may acquire
the fee simple title to lands upon payment of the full market value, in the
language of the constitution, "just compensation." It is necessary that
legislative acts clearly authorize the condemnation of the fee. In the ab-
sence of constitutional restraint such legislative acts are generally held valid.
The fact that many states have not until recently authorized the condemna-
tion of the fee, or that the policy of the law in many states has been opposed
to the acquisition of the fee, does not in any way affect the legal right to
acquire a fee simple title under proper procedure. On principle there does
not appear to be any reason why a condemnor may not be authorized to
acquire the fee simple title. As to whether or not certain condemnors
should not be allowed under the law to acquire the fee is a matter of legis.
lative policy.
It would appear from the decisions to date that if the fee is sought
primarily for purposes of excess condemnation the statute should very
of Saratoga Springs, 146 Misc. 892, 262 N. Y. Supp. 809 (Sup. Ct. 1933), the court
held that the title to the streets was fee simple absolute. In State v. Griftner, 61
Ohio 201, 55 N. E. 612 (1899), the state acquired fee simple title to lands under
statutes of 1825 for canal purposes and the court held it could sell the fee. The court,
in Houston Independent School District v. Reader, 38 S. W. (2d) 610 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1931), held there was nothing in the constitution of the state that prevented
the legislature from authorizing the taking of a fee.
94. In People ex rel. Huempfner v. Benson, 294 Ill. 236, 128 N. E. 387 (1920),
the court held upon vacation of a street or alley, which was held in fee by the city,
the land reverted to the original dedicators, citing People ex rel. Friend v. Wieboldt,
233 Ill. 572, 84 N. E. 646 (1908). In Krueger v. Ramsey, 188 Iowa 861, 175 N. W.
1 (1919), the Supreme Court of Iowa held where the city held the fee, the city
upon vacation could deed the street area so vacated, although upon deeding streets,
the public right to use them was destroyed. The court quoting from Harrington
v. Iowa Central Ry., 126 Iowa 388, 102 N. W. 139 (1905), said "But the city had the
right to vacate the portions of the street referred to (see Code, § 751), and on such
vacation the title of the portions of land formerly occupied by the streets did not
revest in the abutting owners, but remained in the city, and such portions could be
disposed of for other purposes."
In Miller-Carey Drilling Co. v. Shaffer, 144 Kan. 508, 61 P. (2d) 1320 (1936),
the Supreme Court of Kansas held upon vacation of a street held in fee, following
the Kansas Statutes [Rav. STAT. ANN. (1923) and (1935), § 12-506], the land
reverted to the original owners, that is, from whom the improvement was originally
platted.
24
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1938], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol3/iss1/11
EXCESS CONDEMNATION
clearly authorize such purposes, and the procedure so provided, must be
strictly followed in carrying out such proceedings. 5
The salability of the fee as a matter of law cannot be considered, sepa-
rate and apart from the public use, for which it was condemned. In the
cases reviewed the fee was authorized to be sold under certain conditions
imposed by statute. For example, in the Boston flats cases, when the
land was reclaimed, as provided by statute, it was to be sold; or, as in other
cases, when the lands were no longer needed or used for public use, they were
to be sold. Even in Emmons v. Detroit, where excess condemnation was
held valid, it was contemplated that the remainder was to be sold when
it was not needed. The authorities do not hold that land can be condemned
merely for purposes of resale, a mere speculation in real estate.
If excess condemnation is to become valid as a part of our law, it must
be for a public use. Excess condemnation, in the Pennsylvania Mutual case,
where the plan was to impose restrictions upon excess areas and then resell
the same, was held unconstitutional in that it was for a private use. In
Emmons v. Detroit, the constitution and statutes provided for the acquisi-
tion in fee "to secure the greatest degree of public advantage from such
improvement." There the excess area condemned in a street opening was
for a "public purpose." In the Boston flats cases, where the fee was con-
demned, and its resale was authorized, after the land had been elevated
above the water, the use was held to be public in that the resale was inci-
dental to the main public use of sanitation, improving the harbor, and of
expanding the city's usable area.98 Those cases are distinguished from
Salisbury Land & Improvement Co. v. Commonwealth, where the resale of
the condemned areas was authorized at the discretion of the Salisbury Com-
mission. Here there were no great uses involved, like the reclamation of
lands for purposes of public health or improving the harbor. In Boston v.
Talbot, the legislature deemed it of economical advantage to acquire the
excess land rather than risk the outcome of damage claims growing out of
the construction of the tunnel. There the excess appropriation was held
incidental to the public improvement.
If excess condemnation is desired for the purpose of imposing restric-
tions, assuming such proceedings to be legal, serious problems would be
95. Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U. S. 439 (1930); East Cleveland v. Nau, 124
Ohio St. 433, 179 N. E. 187 (1931).
96. Dingley v. Boston, 100 Mass. 544 (1868); Moore v. Sanford, 151 Mass. 285,
24 N. E. 323 (1890); Higginson v. Slattery, 212 Mass. 583, 99 N. E. 523 (1912).
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involved in the ends sought to be attained. It must be remembered that
after the city parts with title it has no power to enforce the restrictions,
and which enforcement must be left to the purchasers. It may be suggested
that restrictions may be imposed by zoning laws, and by the establishment
of building restriction lines through the exercise of the right of eminent
domain.
Certain phases of excess condemnation have been held valid, as is
seen in cases reviewed in this article, and, no doubt, others will be. If
excess condemnation is to be established, statutes must provide for, and
constitutions must not prohibit such taking. The statutes must clearly
authorize the acquisition of the fee simple title and provide for the resale
thereof. Even then excess condemnation depends upon the facts and cir-
cumstances in each project in order to determine whether or not the pur-
poses sought to be accomplished are for a public use.
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